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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4081 
___________ 
 
RONALD BANKS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
REV. ULLI KLEMM, ADMINISTRATOR OF RELIGION; 
JAMES J. MCGRADY, SUPERINTENDENT;  
MICHAEL HOOVER, DEPUTY SUPT.- CENTRALIZED SERVICES;  
REV. JOHN RITCHEY, FACILITY CHAPLAINCY PROGRAM DIRECTOR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-01480) 
District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 2, 2015 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 9, 2015 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
 2 
 
 After his transfer to SCI – Somerset, Ronald Banks, a Pennsylvania inmate, filed 
an amended complaint against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”); the Religion, Volunteer, and Recreational Services Program 
Administrator for the DOC (Ulli Klemm); and three prison officials at SCI – Retreat, 
where he had resided previously.  As we write primarily for the parties, we will refer to 
the details only to the extent they are necessary to the analysis.   
 Essentially, Banks alleged that while he was incarcerated in the Secure Special 
Needs Unit at SCI – Retreat, his rights under the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), the First Amendment, and the Equal 
Protection Clause were violated by prison policies relating to participation in the Islamic 
feasts of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha and to the use of prayer oils during religious 
services.  He also alleged that a DOC memorandum issued by defendant Klemm to all 
DOC Chaplaincy Program Directors limiting indigent Muslims in high security and 
general population units from participation in the Islamic feasts was not promulgated in 
compliance with Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Documents Law.   
 Banks sought declaratory judgments that the defendants’ actions violated his rights 
under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and RLUIPA. He also sought 
several injunctions against all the defendants, including a general injunction to “put an 
end” to the acts and policies described in his complaint, and more specific injunctions to 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
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modify DOC Policy DC-ADM 819 (to allow indigent Muslim prisoners to be placed in 
debt to participate in the feasts of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha) and DOC Policy Statement 
#3.1.1. (to utilize the Inmate General Welfare Fund (“IGWF”) to purchase food for the 
two feasts for indigent Muslims in the high security units and general population).  He 
also requested damages from each defendant. 
 The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted.  
The District Court first concluded that Banks could not recover compensatory and 
punitive damages under RLUIPA, and that his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 
were moot because he had been transferred to SCI – Somerset.  The District Court also 
stated that even if other damages were available or if his case were not moot, Banks 
would not be entitled to relief because Islam did not compel participation in the feast 
meals or the use of prayer oils.  Applying Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987),  the 
District Court rejected the First Amendment claims.  The District Court also considered 
and rejected the Equal Protection challenge.  Banks appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Court exercises plenary 
review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  
Abramson v. William Patterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001).  We may affirm 
on any basis supported by the record.  See Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 
1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988).   
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 Banks’ case, in large part, is moot.  RLUIPA does not allow for the recovery of 
money damages.  See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2012) (“RLUIPA 
does not permit an action against Defendants in their individual capacities . . . [t]hus, 
RLUIPA cannot impose direct liability on Defendants.”); see also Laskaris v. 
Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment 
bars a suit for damages against state officials acting in their official capacities).   The only 
relief potentially available to Banks for his RLUIPA claims is injunctive or declaratory, 
but to the extent that Banks seeks that relief against defendants at SCI – Retreat, his 
claims are moot because he was transferred to SCI – Somerset.  He no longer presents a 
live case or controversy for injunctive relief regarding the policies or practices at SCI – 
Retreat because an injunction where he is no longer imprisoned would not provide him 
meaningful relief.  See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1993).  On 
this record, any future incarceration of Banks at SCI – Retreat is speculative, so his case 
not does not present an issue capable of repetition, yet evading review regarding the relief 
against the SCI – Retreat defendants.  See id.  Although “[t]he mootness of a . . . claim 
for injunctive relief is not necessarily dispositive regarding the mootness of . . . [a] claim 
for a declaratory judgment,” Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1025 (10th Cir. 2011), 
Banks’ claims for declarations the SCI – Retreat defendants are similarly moot, see id. at 
1027-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that prison-specific claims are moot on transfer 
because a declaration that a prisoner was wronged at institution where he no longer 
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resides has no effect on a defendant’s behavior toward him).  Furthermore, Banks 
specifically noted in his complaint that the use of prayer oil, at least at Friday services, 
was not an issue at SCI – Somerset.  Similarly, Banks’ First Amendment and Equal 
Protection claims for other injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendants at SCI 
– Retreat are moot. 
 Remaining are his RLUIPA claims against Superintendent Beard and defendant 
Klemm for declarative and injunctive relief relating to the terms of the DOC-wide 
policies DC-ADM 819 and Policy Statement #3.1.1, his claims for damages for purported 
violations of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, and his claims of a 
violation of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Documents Law.1   
 We conclude that summary judgment was properly granted on the Equal 
Protection claims.  The District Court’s analysis of how Christmas is treated as a cultural 
phenomenon or nationally recognized holiday (on pages 23-25 of the District Court’s 
memorandum) and why the use of IGWF funds for it is different from the use of those 
funds for meals for some inmates on Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha is sound.  As the District 
Court explained, indigency is not a suspect class.  There is a rational reason (cost-
containment) for treating indigent versus non-indigent prisoners differently.  Also as the 
District Court concluded, the ban on prayer oil stems from a distinct documented problem 
                                              
1 We agree with the defendants that Banks did not raise a due process claim in his 
amended complaint.     
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at that institution.2  And Banks did not controvert the evidence that RARs submitted by 
inmates of different faiths are treated the same.   
 Also, although the District Court did not explicitly address it, the defendants were 
entitled to judgment in their favor on the Commonwealth Documents Law claim.  The 
Documents law sets forth procedures to be followed when a state agency issues binding 
regulations.  See Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 668-69 (Pa. 1998).  However, Banks 
could not succeed on his Commonwealth Documents Law claim because the 
memorandum written by defendant Klemm that Banks cited was not a regulation under 
the terms of the statute.  A regulation is a rule promulgated through the statutory 
authority of an agency to administer a statute or to prescribe a practice or procedure 
before the agency.  45 P.S. § 1102(12).  DOC bulletins and policy statements are not 
regulations; instead they are “agency decisions inherently committed to the agency’s 
sound discretion.”  See Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 669-70 (Pa. 1998) (noting the 
DOC’s need to be able to modify reasonable rules of internal prison management as 
conditions require); Bundy v. Beard, 924 A.2d 723, 727-28 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).   
                                              
2 To the extent that Banks raises a challenge to an order denying his motion to compel 
disciplinary records relating to theft or abuse of prayer oils, we conclude that he has not 
shown that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his request as irrelevant 
(given that neither the identity of those who took prayer oils nor whether they were 
punished could controvert the prison officials’ documentation of the theft problem) and 
unduly burdensome (as the prison did not maintain misconduct records in a way that they 
could be searched for the issue of problems with prayer oil).  See United States v. Al 
Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 605 (3d Cir. 2004) (setting forth the standard of review for 
discovery rulings).   
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 Banks also pursues RLUIPA claims against Beard and Klemm with respect to DC-
ADM 819 and Policy Statement #3.1.1.  DC-ADM 819 is the DOC’s policy statement on 
religious activities.  Among the religious accommodations it lists is that “special foods 
and diets may be provided as required for the celebration of major religious holidays 
consistent with established [DOC] policy.”  DC-ADM 819(G)(1).  Banks seeks a 
modification of the policy to allow indigent Muslim prisoners to be placed in debt to 
participate in the feasts of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.  In effect, he wants a policy in 
which special foods (including optional items) must be provided for the celebration of 
Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.  In relevant part, Policy Statement #3.1.1, the Fiscal 
Administration policy, states that IGWF funds may be expended only on approved 
categories, which include “gifts to inmate packages” at “major holidays” and “non 
specific religious items” for the chapel and other items “used for various religious and 
secular activities” in the chapel.  Banks argues that to comply with RLUIPA, it should be 
modified to allow the use of IGWF funds to purchase food for the two feasts for indigent 
Muslims in the high security units and general population.     
 In addition to mootness grounds, the defendants argued, and the District Court 
alternatively noted, that Banks had not established that any sincerely held religious belief 
had been burdened.  The conclusion was based on the premise that Islam did not require 
participation in a feast or meal on Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.  In relevant part, RLUIPA 
provides: 
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No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise 
of a person residing in or confined to an institution, . . . even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person[] (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).  A substantial burden exists for the purposes of RLUIPA if  
“1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and 
forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates versus abandoning one 
of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts 
substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his 
beliefs.”  Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).       
 If a litigant presents prima facie evidence that his free exercise rights were 
substantially burdened, the government must show that the burden is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest and is “the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . 
interest.”  Washington, 497 F.3d at 277 (citing RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).  The 
application of the compelling interest standard is context-specific and deferential to the 
prison authorities’ choices about how to run their institution.  Id. at 283 (citing Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2005)).  “We do not read RLUIPA to elevate 
accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and 
safety.”  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.  A prison policy that “is related to maintaining good 
order and controlling costs” serves a compelling government interest.  See Baranowski v. 
Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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 The District Court erred in rejecting Banks’ RLUIPA claim on the basis that Islam 
did not require participation in a feast meal.  The religious exercise protected under 
RLUIPA includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.  Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715 (citing § 2000cc-5(7)(A)) (quotation 
marks omitted); Washington, 497 F.3d at 276 (explaining that a court does not inquire 
into whether a belief is compelled by, or central to, a religion).  Banks professed his 
belief that full participation in a communal feast is central to the practice of his religion 
and essential to the receipt of blessings.  Although the defendants countered that it was 
“undisputed” that Islam did not require participation in a feast or meal on Eid al-Fitr and 
Eid al-Adha, their evidence does not make the issue undisputed.  Cf. Ford v. McGinnis, 
352 F.3d 582, 590-91 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering a prisoner’s belief about the feast of 
Eid al-Fitr and noting that religious authorities employed by the DOC cannot trump a 
plaintiff’s sincere and religious belief in the evaluation of a First Amendment claim).  
Banks made assertions about the critical importance of full participation in the feasts.  
Taking all inferences in his favor, we conclude that he could also maintain a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether the government put substantial pressure on him 
to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs at the time of the Muslim 
feasts.         
 However, even assuming that Banks’ religious exercise was substantially 
burdened, the defendants offered a financial rationale that serves as a compelling interest 
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to disallow the DOC’s purchase of optional items for all or an account deficiency 
(although the District Court did not reach this step).  Although Banks presented the 
alternative of allowing non-indigent inmates to pay for optional items or other feast costs 
for indigent inmates, the defendants provided evidence that they did not let inmates 
purchase items for each other on the basis of security concerns.  The rationale they 
provided was that an inmate who buys things for another inmate could coerce that inmate 
to perform illicit or illegal acts, engage in blackmail, or otherwise jeopardize the security 
of the institution.  On the record before us, it does not appear that the security and 
budgetary interests the defendants describe could be achieved by a different or lesser 
means.3  See Baranowski, 486 F.3d at 125-26 (citing Cutter).   
 Similarly, in the First Amendment context, we do not evaluate whether a particular 
belief is true; we consider only whether the litigant sincerely holds a particular belief and 
whether that belief is religious in nature.  See Ford, 352 F.3d at 590-91; cf. DeHart v. 
Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a belief that is both sincerely held 
and religious in nature is entitled to constitutional protection).  It is at least genuinely 
disputed whether the feasts and prayer oils are Banks’ sincere beliefs that are religious in 
nature.     
                                              
3 Similarly, to the extent that Banks’ claim was based on being deprived of the communal 
nature of the feast more than specific food items because of his assignment to segregated 
housing, the prison’s interest in segregating certain inmates from the general population 
could not be differently achieved.  See Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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 To evaluate Banks’ First Amendment claim, we must apply the four-factor test set 
forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), to determine whether the policy challenged 
as impinging on rights is “reasonably related to penological interests.”  DeHart v. Horn, 
227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).  As we have explained:  
[Turner] directs courts to assess the overall reasonableness of 
such regulations by weighing four factors. “First, there must 
be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation 
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify 
it,” and this connection must not be “so remote as to render 
the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Second, a court must 
consider whether inmates retain alternative means of 
exercising the circumscribed right. Third, a court must take 
into account the costs that accommodating the right would 
impose on other inmates, guards, and prison resources 
generally. And fourth, a court must consider whether there are 
alternatives to the regulation that “fully accommodate[ ] the 
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological 
interests.” 
 
Id. (citing Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citations 
omitted)).   
 Although the District Court’s analysis of the First Amendment question focused 
too much on the dictates of Islam, its conclusion that the prison policy was reasonably 
related to penological objectives is sound.  Also, the District Court noted alternatives 
ways to participate in the feasts.  The cost-containment rationale serves as a valid reason 
for rejecting some of Banks’ proposed alternatives.  And while the District Court did not 
explicitly consider the use of IGWF funds or Banks’ proposal that non-indigent inmates 
could purchase meals for indigent ones, as we noted above, the prison provided a 
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rationale for rejecting those alternatives.  Also, there were security concerns regarding the 
prayer oils (there was an institution-specific record of a problem with theft of prayer oil).   
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
